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ESTOPPEL AGAINST STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY
RicHmm A. CLARK
Because of the recent expansion of the activities engaged in by
both state and municipal governments,.the problem of legal hazards
to which they are subject becomes increasingly important. One such
hazard is estoppel. In general estoppel is the principle that one who
wrongfully or negligently induces another to adversely change Ins
position will be precluded from pleading the falsity of his acts or
representations to his own advantage.'
AGAINST THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL
The greater number of cases invoking or attempting to invoke
estoppel against a governmental unit, especially in recent years, in-
volves contracts or representations. The Washington decision of State
v. Northwest Magnesite Co.' is typical. The state had leased certain
I Carruthers v. Whitney, 56 Wash. 327, 105 Pac. 831 (1909). For general treat-
ment of the subject of estoppel in this field see 31 C. J. S., EsToPPEL, 403-436, §§ 138-
147, 19 Am. JiRm, EsToPPEL, 818-822, §§ 165-169.
2 127 Wash. Dec. 900, 182 P.(2d) 643 (1947).
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school lands in 1917 to the assignor of the defendant for the purpose
of developing magnesite deposits. The agreement provided for the
payment of four per cent royalties to the state on the basis of lessee's
gross receipts less certain specified costs. In 1934, in order to allow
further development of the property, the commissioner of public lands
orally modified the earlier arrangement so as to permit the defendant
to remit royalties on the basis of net profits. Defendant subsequently
at great expense developed the property paying royalties according to
the modification. In 1943 the state instituted suit to recover royalties
claimed due under the I9M7 agreement. Defendant pleaded estoppel
which the Supreme Court, m reversing the trial court, demed because
the state was acting in a governmental as distinguished from a proprie-
tary capacity Even conceding arguendo that estoppel may lie in cer-
tain instances against a state acting governmentally, said the court, it
would not lie here for three reasons: (i) the evidence did not justify
an estoppel, (2) estoppel may not be used to enforce an illegal con-
tract; and (3) estoppel may not be used to enforce the promise of
one who has no authority to enter upon the undertaking.
The Washington court is reluctant to apply estoppel against the state
when it acts in a governmental capacity 8 A few courts go further and
hold that the state, because it is the sovereign, is never subject to
estoppel, regardless of the capacity in which it acts.4 The majority
view, like Washington's, allows estoppel against the state in the same
instances in which it may be invoked against a county or city, %.e.,
when it is acting in a proprietary capacity
In most cases in which a distinction is made between governmental
and proprietary activities municipalities are involved. It should be
recognized that a municipal corporation is of a twofold character. It
exercises under statute or charter a part of the sovereign power of the
state. In addition, since a municipal corporation is created mainly for
the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality, it acts for its
own private advantage.' Realizing this, courts say that in its govern-
8 Bennett v. Grays Harbor County, 15 Wn.(2d) 331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942).
4 Refunding Board of Ark. v. State Highway Audit Commission, 189 Ark. 144,
70 S. W.(2d) 1027 (1934), State ex rel. Veale v. Paul, 113 Kan. 412, 214 Pac. 425(1923), State v. McCurdy, 171 Okl. 445, 43 P.(2d) 124 (1935), Baker v. State High-
way Dept., 166 S. C. 481, 165 S. E. 197 (1932).
5 Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 104 Pac. 834 (1909), MCQuILLAN, MUINICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev.) 408, § 136.
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mental or public character the city acts for the common good of all,
while m its proprietary capacity it is acting for its own benefit.'
Once the activity is found to be proprietary the governmental body
is subject to the same rules that govern ordinary individuals, and con-
sequently it should expect to receive no more favorable treatment than
is fair between men."
The distinction between the two forms of activity has been said to
be based on public policy,' on the exercise of police power,8 or upon
the exercise of some public right." But since by hypothesis the con-
duct of the state or municipal corporation is misleading and detri-
mental, the real basis for the doctrine should be that to allow estoppel
against such body would result in hindering the performance of its
sovereign duties."
When governmental bodies were in the early stages of development,
strict adherence to the governmental-proprietary distinction as to mat-
ters of estoppel might have been advisable in order to permit develop-
ment with a nmmum of interference. This is a less valid argument
today when most government bodies are as well-organized and
-financed as large businesses. Examnation of cases shows that the
dividing line between governmental and proprietary activities is not
distinct.'" It is submitted that at tis date a function should not be
6 Seattle v. Stirrat, supra note 5, Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P. (2d)
1152 (1937), Krnngs v. Bremerton, 22 Wn.(2d) 220, 155 P.(2d) 493 (1945).7 Franklin County v. Carstens, 68 Wash. 176, 122 Pac. 999 (1912), State ex rel.
Washington Paving Co. v. Clausen, 90 Wash. 450, 156 Pac. 554 (1916), State v.
Carlyon, 166 Wash. 498, 7 P.(2d) 572 (1932). See Eagles v. General Electric Co.,
5 Wn.(2d) 20, 104 P.(2d) 912 (1940) .8 People v. Ill. Women's Athletic Club, 360 Ill. 577, 196 N. E. 881 (1935), Ex
parte Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 508, 233 N. W. 890 (1931).
s Estoppel cannot be used to defeat the exercise of police power. Liles v. Crevel-
ing, 151 Tenn. 61, 268 S. W. 625 (1925), City of Clifton Forge v. Virginia Western
Power Co., 129 Va. 377, 106 S. E. 400 (1921).
0 Melvin v. Comm. Consol. School Dist., 312 Ill. 376, 144 N. E. 13 (1924), Attor-
ney General v. City of Methuen, 226 Mass. 564, 129 N. E. 662 (1921).
11 This reason frequently is used in tort cases. See note in 22 CORN. L. Q. 87,
Bochard, Government Lubility in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 129 at 133 (1924).
22 Compare Krings v. Bremerton, 22 Wn. (2d) 220, 155" P. (2d) 493 (1945)
(operating a garbage disposal system held governmental) with City of East Point
v. Upchurch Packing Co., 58 Ga. Appl. 829, 200 S. E. 210 (1938) (operating an
electric light and water plant held proprietary), Bennett v. Grays Harbor County,
15 Wn.(2d) 331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942) (sale of property purchased by county at
general tax foreclosure sale for want of other purchasers held governmental) with
Eagles v. General Electric Co., 5 Wn.(2d) 20, 104 P.(2d) 912 (1940) (property
sold for taxes; state, having accepted purchase price, was estopped to assert lien
on property for further unpaid fees), Strand v. State, 16 Wn.(2d) 107, 132 P.(2d)
1011 (1943) (disposal of public lands held proprietary) with State v. Northwest
Magnesite Co., 127 Wash. Dec. 900, 182 P.(2d) 643 (1947) (lease of school lands
held governmental).
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denominated governmental unless its discharge is essential to the ex-
istence of the governmental unit. No Washington case has been found
adequately dealing with the rationale of the doctrine,13 nor has suffi-
cient consideration been given in decisions to the burdens that might
befall a public body if estoppel were allowed. For example, it is ques-
tionable whether finding an estoppel in the principal case would result
in hampering government; 1 yet the state would almost certainly be
burdened if estoppel were to be allowed in tax matters. Since estoppel
is permitted against the state or municipal corporation acting proprie-
tarily, no different rule should apply when such body acts m what
courts have heretofore classified as governmental unless there is this
danger. This would not only be more just, but it would also increase
business confidence and faith in government.
At present for estoppel to be a successful defense it is necessary to
show not only that the governmental unit was acting in a proprietary
capacity but also that the official acted within the scope of his statutory
powers. 5 The rationales used are (i) that a person dealing with a
public officer is presumed to know the limit of his authority,"8 and
(2) that it is legally impossible for a public officer to act beyond his
authority 17
The general rule that the public body is not estopped by the unau-
thorized acts of its officers is not affected by the fact that it has
received benefits.' Nor does the doctrine of apparent authority apply "6
is Krings v. Bremerton, 22 Wn. (2d) 220, 155 P.(2d) 493 (1945) quoting from
19 Am. Jun., ESTOPPEL, 820, § 168 seems to suggest that the reason is to prevent
hampering of the public in the performance of its duties or the exercise of its
police power. Compare with Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.(2d) 1152
(1937) which discusses the basis of immunity of municipal corporations in tort
matters when agents are engaged in governmental duties.
"&It must be remembered, however, that the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion was merely one basis for the ultimate holding in the case.
15 "Regardless of the capacity in which the state acts, whether proprietary or
governmental, the principal of estoppel will not apply to an unauthorized act or
ultra vires act of state officials." Strand v. State, 16 Wn.(2d) 107, 119, 132 P.(2d)
1011 (1943).
18 Chehalis County v. Hutcheson, 21 Wash. 82, 57 Pac. 341 (1899) , Paul v. Seattle,
40 Wash. 294, 82 Pac. 601 (1905), Brougham v. Seattle, i94 Wash. 1, 76 P.(2d)
1013 (1938), Pehrson v. School Dist. No. 334, 194 Wash. 334, 77 P.(2d) 1022
(1938), Bennett v. Grays Harbor County, 15 Wn.(2d) 331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942).
1 State ex rel. Fishback v. Globe Casket Etc. Co., 82 Wash. 124, 143 Pac. 878
(1914), State ex rel. National Bank v. Tacoma, 97 Wash. 190, 166 Pac. 66 (1917),
State v. N. W Magnesite Co., 127 Wash. Dec. 900, 182 P.(2d) 643 (1947).
Is Paul v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 294, 82 Pac. 601 (1905)
19 Bennett v. Grays Harbor County, 15 Wn.(2d) 331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942),
Spieker v. Board of Rapid Transit Com'rs, 37 Ohio Appl. 102, 174 N. E. 15
(1930). See Paul v. Seattle, supra note 18. But see Hentherington-Berner Co. v. Spo-
kane, 75 Wash. 660, 135 Pac. 484 (1913).
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The latter is not unreasonable since there is little justification for
relying on appearances when the authority of public officers is defined
by a readily accessible statute or ordinance.
If the contract or act is beyond the authority of both the acting
official and the governmental unit itself, regardless of the capacity in
which it acts, obviously estoppel cannot apply 0 Otherwise the public
would be deprived of safeguards which were intended in defining the
powers of government." This is true even though the governmental
body has received benefits. 2
Cases in which there is a total lack of power to enter into a certain
transaction must be distinguished from those in which there is an
irregular exercise of an existing power. Where. a governmental body
has entered into a permitted contract in an unauthorized manner and
has actually received benefits from the transaction, recovery is allowed
on either of two theories. Some courts invoke an estoppel. s Others
permit recovery in quantum meruit. The latter rule is exemplified by
the earlier Washington cases.2"
However, the recent case of Hailey v. King County2" decided that
the quantum meruit rule may not be invoked to fasten liability on a
city or county for purely personal services, but that it is limited to
situations where material benefits have been received. It is submitted
that there is no substantial reason for this distinction, unjust enrich-
ment occurring in either situation, and if the "obligation to do jus-
tice is recognized in one case there is no sound reason for ignoring
it in the other. Although the dissent in Green v. Okanogan County27
2 0 Arnott v. Spokane, 6 Wash. 442, 33 Pac. 1063 (1893), State v. Pullman, 23
Wash. 583, 63 Pac. 265 (1900), State ex rel. Spring Water Co. v. Monroe, 40 Wash.
545, 82 Pac. 888 (1905), Turner Investment Co. v. Seattle, 70 Wash. 201, 126 Pac.
426 (1912), State ex rel. Booth v. Tatro, 199 Wash. 421, 92 P.(2d) 206 (1939),
State v. N. W. Magnesite Co., 127 Wash. Dec. 900, 182 P. (2d) 643 (1947).
21 State v. Pullman, supra note 20.
22 State v. Pullman, supra note 20; Bennett v. Grays Harbor County, 15 Wn. (2d)
331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942).2 Wykes v. City Water Co., 184 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 9th 1911), State v. Register
of State Land Offices, 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519 (1939), Reeves v. Leich, 194 La.
1070, 195 So. 542 (1940), City of Port Arthur v. Young, 37 S. W.(2d) 385 (Tex.
1931). Accord, Seward v. Fisken, 122 Wash. 225, 210 Pac. 378 (1922), a Washing-
ton case utilizing this approach which stands alone in actually allowing an estoppel
to be invoked against a governmental agency when it has acted n its "sovereign"
capacity. See State v. Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 63 Pac. 265 (1900).
24 Cases collected in Gehr v. Ferry County, 179 Wash. 68, 72, 36 P. (2d) 71
(1934).
2521 Wn.(2d) 53, 149 P.(2d) 823 (1944).
20 Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall (77 U. S.) 676 at 684, which is quoted with
approval in Hailey v. King County, supra note 25 at p. 57
27 60 Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (1910).
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quoted with approval in the Haley case" seems to throw doubt on the
quantum meruit rule in both situations, the quotation's effectiveness
should be limited to the purpose for which it was primarily cited," and
as stated above, the quantum meruit rule still applies where material
benefits are involved.
Although the rule is well settled in Washington that estoppel can-
not be applied against the people when acting in their sovereign
capacity, three cases suggest that an exception may be made to this
rule when necessary to prevent "manifest injustice.""0 This approach
has not yet been used nor its limits defined." Nevertheless, the way is
open for its use by the court to prevent the harsher consequences of
the doctrine.
Thus one who asserts estoppel against a public body has an ex-
tremely difficult task. He must show- (i) that the transaction was
proprietary, (2) not ultra vires, and (3) that the governmental agent
acted within his authority His task is eased somewhat by the quan-
tum meruit rule in cases involving municipal corporations where the
corporation received material benefits, but this rule does not apply
where purely personal services are involved. There is also the possi-
bility of a "manifest injustice" approach.
WITH REFERENCE TO CLAIM STATUTES
Estoppel to assert failure to timely present claims against a county
or city is but one aspect of the general doctrine of estoppel. 2 Two
recent Washington cases have presented this problem. 8
In Forseth v. Tacoma," plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old girl, was
seriously injured in a collision between a negligently driven Tacoma
2821 Wn.(2d) 53, 149 P.(2d) 823 (1944).
29 The reason given was that it was necessary in order to protect the public
against weak or dishonest officials.
80 Bennett v. Grays Harbor County, 15 Wn.(2d) 331, 130 P.(2d) 1041 (1942),
Krings v. Bremerton, 22 Wn.(2d) 220, 155 P.(2d) 493 (1945), State v. N. W
Magnesite Co., 127 Wash. Dec. 900, 182 P.(2d) 643 (1947).81 Bennett v Grays Harbor, supra note 30 at p. 343, referring to Franklin County
v. Carstens, 68 Wash. 176, 122 Pac. 999 (1912) said, "the facts in that case were
clearly such as to warrant equitable estoppel against the county in order to
prevent what otherwise would have been a manifest gross injustice."
32 For information involving cases wherein the plaintiff has failed to file a claim
within the statutory period see 82 A. L. R. 749 and 153 A. L. R. 329. For digest of
cases dealing with the problem of estoppel and waiver where a notice has been filed
within the prescribed statutory period but is defective in form see 148 A. L. R. 637
88 Two earlier cases had assumed that a city could waive the provisions of the
statute and that an estoppel could lie. Cole v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 1, 116 Pac. 257(1911), Collins v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 153, 116 Pac. 663 (1911).
84 127 Wash. Dec. 268, 178 P.(2d) 357 (1947).
COMMENTS
city bus, on which she was a passenger, and another vehicle. The city
carried liability insurance, and the insurance company adjuster was re-
quested by the city's Department of Public Works to interview the
plaintiff and if possible to settle her claim. He informed her of his
authority and led her to believe she needed no lawyer but was safe in
conducting negotiations with him. He then delayed the negotiations
until more than sixty days had elapsed, after which he informed her of
the sixty day limitation prescribed by the city charter for the filing of
claims. Dissatisfied with the adjuster's offer, she filed claim and then
brought suit against the city alleging it had waived and was now
estopped from msisting upon strict enforcement of the limitation
period. The Supreme Court held that the city was not precluded from
pleading the charter provisions even assuming the adjuster was the
agent for the city, saying that such provisions are mandatory and that
municipal officers cannot disregard them.
In Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 5 plamtiff, an abstractor for a
local title company, fell from a ladder in the county clerk's office
while examining records. She filed a claim within the prescribed period
but it was defective in form. Conceding the necessity of substantial
compliance with the statute she urged that the county commissioners
had waived all rights to insist upon it. The Supreme Court in affirming
the trial court said that the comnnssioners did not have the power to
waive observance of the statutory requirements, nor could an express
attempt to waive estop the county from asserting such lack of com-
pliance.
There is a difference between these cases in that in the Forseth case
there was a complete failure to file the claim within the alioted time,
while in the Caron case the claim although timely was defective in
form. A few courts representing a minority think that this difference is
sufficiently important to justify divergent holdings.8 However, the
majority treat the principles involved as analogous, the rationale being
that such provisions are intended to protect the public and afford the
85 18 Wn.(2d) 397, 139 P.(2d) 626 (1943).
86Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213 (1924), at p. 215,
"There is a wide distinction between presenting a defective claim which at least
names the time, place, and the circumstances of the injury and in presenting no
claim at all. In the first supposed case the municipality is at least notified sufficiently
to investigate the merits of the claim, which evidently is the main purpose of the
statute. In the second supposed case the city receives no notice at all, and the very
purpose of the statute is defeated."
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city or county opportunity to make a complete and intelligent mvesti-
gation of the facts."
In adopting this rule the Washington court has aligned itself with
the weight of authority in this country 88 In most claim statute cases
there is talk of both waiver and estoppel. If there is lack of power uif
a municipal corporation to waive compliance with a statute, 9 it seems
that estoppel should be inapplicable. However, there is a contrary
view on the basis that waiver and estoppel are different. 0 Conceding
the difference," estoppel should still not lie since generally a prohibi-
tion or complete lack of power in a statute cannot be circumvented by
applying the doctrine of estoppel . 2 As seen heretofore, lack of power
was always a good defense in a suit against a municipality, and if it
should now be held that a city is estopped by reason of the conduct of
its officers even though the activity is beyond the powers of the city,
then the rule that an ultra vires act by a city does not subject it to
liability would be nullified."3
Are the majority courts correct in holding that there is no power in
the city or its officials to waive compliance with the statute? The
question is perhaps best answered by the recent California case of
Farrell v. Placer County," in which the court said.
37 Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 18 Wn.(2d) 397, 139 P.(2d) 626 (1943),
Forseth v. Tacoma, 127 Wash. Dec. 268, 178 P.(2d) 357 (1947).
88 It seems that eighteen states may be classified as being in accord with the view
expressed by the Washington court while at least six states take the opposite posi-
tion. See material referred to in note 32, £upra.
19 Among cases stating that a municipality is completely powerless to waive
compliance with such statutes are. Cooper v. Butte County, 17 Cal. Appl.(2d) 43,
61 P.(2d) 516 (1936), Kline v. San Francisco United School District, 40 Cal.
Appl.(2d) 174, 104 P.(2d) 661 (1940), Hall v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal.(2d) 198, 120
P.(2d) 13 (1941), Walter v. Ottowa, 240 I1. 259, 88 N. E. 651 (1919), Brown v.
Winthrop, 275 Mass. 43, 175 N. E. 50 (1931). Others merely say that waiver is
beyond the official's powers. Phillips v. City of Abilene, 195 S. W. (2d) 147 (Tex.
1946). This seems to be the approach used in the Caron and Forseth cases.40 14 RocxY MT. L. REv. 219 criticizing Hall v. Los Angeles, supra note 39, a
case similar to the Caron case. See Garrison v. California Employment Stabilization
Com'n, 64 Cal. Appl.(2d) 820, 149 P.(2d) 711 (1944) at p. 716. "It is unnecessary
to pass upon the power [of the commission] to make the rule, because the com-
mission is estopped to take such a position [denying the power]." This case seems
to stand alone on this point; in all other cases there is expressly or impliedly found
the power of waiver in the body sought to be estopped. The importance of a lack
of power to waive as effecting estoppel is brought out by a comparison of two Texas
cases, City of Waco v. Thralls, 172 S. W.(2d) 142 (Tex. 1942) and Phillips v. City
of Abilene, 195 S. W.(2d) 147 (Tex. 1946).
41 Difference is discussed in Reynolds v. Travelers Insurance Co., 176 Wash. 36,
28 P.(2d) 310 (1934).
42 Bardsley v. Sternberg, 17 Wash. 243, 49 Pac. 499 (1897), State v. Pullman, 23
Wash. 583, 63 Pac. 265 (1900), Phillips v. City of Abilene, 195 S. W.(2d) 147 (Tex.
1946).
43 Cooper v. Butte County, 17 Cal. Appl.(2d) 43, 61 P.(2d) 516 (1936).
4423 Cal.(2d) 624, 145 P.(2d) 570 at 573 (1944).
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It has been intimated by some authorities that the claim statute is the
measure of power of the governmental agency in paying tort claims in-
volved, and hence any deviation from that procedure cannot be dispensed
with by waiver, estoppel, or otherwise. That conclusion, at least with
respect to the time of filing the claim, is not supported by the statute or
reason. The various reasons advanced for the adoption of the claim statutes,
that is, to afford the agency an opportunity to investigate the merits of the
claim and to arrive at a settlement, thus avoiding litigation, are not incon-
sistent with the view that the statute is not the measure of power. Hence
the filing of the clai within ninety days, while mandatory upon the
claimant and a condition precedent to us cause of action, is nothing more
than a procedural requirement as to the agency, which, as to the claimant,
may be excused by estoppel.
This approach, it is submitted, is correct. Claim statutes were not
designed as shields to avoid liability to bona fide claimants. Since a
requirement of the minority view is that the city must have an oppor-
tunity to make a thorough investigation of the claim, 5 it offers the
same essential protection to the municipality as does the majority rule
while eliminating decisions based on mere form and technicality This
requirement may not have been met m the Caron case since the com-
missioners never received certain information, but it would seem satis-
fied in the Forseth case, where before the sixty day period the city
through its agent obtained sufficient information so as to enable it to
adequately investigate the accident. This approach merely exemplifies
the idea that in certain instances a public body should expect to
receive no more than just treatment. As was appropriately said in
Farrell v. Placer County:'8
If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, "Men must turn square corners when
they deal with the government," it is hard to see why the government
should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing
with its citizens.
In conclusion it seems that estoppel should not lie unless power to
waive compliance with a statute is properly found. It is submitted that
the better reasoned cases hold that such statutes are essentially pro-
cedural in nature and not the measure of the municipality's power.
45 Farrel v. Placer County, supra note 44, Badger v. Upper Darby Twp., 348 Pa.
551, 36 A.(2d) 507 (1944).40 Supra note 44, at p. 572, quoting from MacQmre and Zimet, Hobson's Choice
and Similar Practices tn Federal Taxation, 48 HiARV. L. REv. 1241 (1935).
